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Abstract: I challenge two key as-
sumptions of speech act theory, as 
applied to argumentation: illocution-
ary monism, grounded in the idea 
each utterance has only one (primary) 
illocutionary force, and the dyadic 
reduction, which models interaction 
as a dyadic affair between only two 
agents (speaker-hearer, proponent-
opponent). I show how major contri-
butions to speech act inspired study of 
argumentation adhere to these as-
sumptions even as illocutionary 
pluralism in argumentative pol-
ylogues is a significant empirical fact 
in need of theoretical attention. I 
demonstrate this with two examples 
where arguers interacting with multi-
ple persons convey plural, argumenta-
tively relevant illocutionary forces. 
Understanding illocutionary pluralism 
in argumentative polylogues also 
affords a better account of fallacious 
and manipulative discourse. 
Résumé: Je conteste deux hypothèses 
clés de la théorie des actes de langage 
appliquée à l'argumentation : l'une du 
monisme illocutoire, fondée sur l'idée 
que chaque énoncé n'a qu'une seule 
force illocutoire (primaire) ; et la 
réduction dyadique, qui modélise 
l'interaction comme une affaire 
dyadique entre seulement deux agents 
(locuteur-auditeur, promoteur-
opposant). Les contributions majeures 
à l'étude de l'argumentation inspirée 
par les actes de langage adhèrent à ces 
hypothèses. Ainsi, la théorie de 
l'argumentation devrait embrasser le 
pluralisme illocutoire dans les pol-
ylogues argumentatifs. Je démontre le 
fonctionnement de tels échanges 
argumentatifs complexes avec deux 
exemples où des personnes qui 
argumentent entre elles interagissent 
avec plusieurs autres personnes et en 
même temps transmettent plusieurs 
forces illocutoires et pertinentes dans 
leur argumentation. Le pluralisme 
illocutoire dans les polylogues argu-
mentatifs permet également de mieux 
rendre compte des discours fallacieux 
et manipulateurs. 




© Marcin Lewiński. Informal Logic, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021), pp. 421–451. 
1. Introduction 
Speech act theory and argumentation theory provide a powerful 
account of what human interaction is about. This is especially so 
when we consider them jointly as mutually reinforcing, comple-
mentary theories. Interaction is not a mere exchange of infor-
mation; it is, rather, a joint human activity in which people per-
form certain intentional acts to achieve their individual and collec-
tive goals.1 These intentional acts are predominantly performed in 
speech: they are, that is, speech acts. And for these speech acts to 
be performed in the pursuit of individual and collective goals, 
there needs to exist some presumption of rationality behind them.2 
Argumentation is there to protect this presumption when things go 
wrong. And because things go wrong pretty much all the time—
joint activities cannot quite succeed without quality control, and, 
whenever needed, the resolution of doubt and the management of 
disagreement—argumentation is a ubiquitous feature of our inter-
actions. It is a powerful backup generator constantly connected to 
our interactional grid. While this generator is fuelled by reasons—
there is no argument-making without reason-giving—its energy 
mix includes many other powerful ingredients: questions, chal-
lenges, rebuttals, concessions, retractions, clarifications, and other 
metalinguistic interventions. Curiously, these ingredients them-
selves can be, and have been, analyzed as speech acts. In this way, 
 
1 I consider this to be an impeccably Gricean insight (see also Tomasello 2008). 
Grice writes: 
“The conversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicatures 
connected with them, are specially connected (I hope) with the particular 
purposes that talk (and so, talk exchange) is adapted to serve and is primarily 
employed to serve. I have stated my maxims as if this purpose were a maximal-
ly effective exchange of information; this specification is, of course, too narrow, 
and the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such general purposes as 
influencing or directing the actions of others.” (Grice 1975, p. 47). 
Yet, Gricean “as-ifness” tends to be obliterated and the exclusive focus on 
information exchange remains a persistent analytic practice. For an otherwise 
excellent formalized model of human interaction, but limited to its information-
exchange function, see Roberts (2012). 
2 In the 20th century analytic philosophy defended, among others, by Davidson 
(1973), Dennet (1971), and Grice (1975). For a discussion of this presumption, 
see Lewiński (2012).  
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speech acts and argumentation inescapably rely on one another’s 
resources. 
Two qualities of speech act theory and argumentation theory 
stand out as the key sources of their success. First, our interaction-
al contributions, utterances, are treated as functional units: each 
utterance is aimed to perform an identifiable act that is defined by 
its function, that is, by the conventionally recognizable job it does 
in the social world. This function—called illocutionary force in 
Austin’s pioneering How to do things with words (1962)—is 
intended, communicated, taken up (or not), and acted upon (or 
ignored). And much of the speech acts’ powerful attraction in 
capturing our interactional business relies on the assumption that 
what is exchanged are monofunctional units. Speech acts are 
conceptually powerful and parsimonious as basic units of commu-
nication precisely because each speech act in a given conversa-
tional situation has one and only one (primary) function: when I’m 
promising, I’m not asking a question; when I’m voting, I’m not 
complaining about the weather—much in the same way as when 
I’m cooking a soup, I’m not baking a cake in one and the same 
string of physical acts (words pronounced, movements of my 
hands). This assumption can simply be called illocutionary mon-
ism (Johnson 2019). Second, the basic model of interaction in-
volves two and only two agents: the speaker and the hearer, who in 
an argumentative situation can instead be called the proponent and 
the opponent or the protagonist and the antagonist. Interaction, at 
its very basis, consists in an exchange of monofunctional speech 
acts between these two agents (Searle 1992). This latter assump-
tion can be called the dyadic reduction (see Lewiński 2019).  
My goal in this paper is to challenge these two assumptions of 
speech act theory as applied to argumentation.3 While they might 
be the very conditions of success of the theory, allowing it to work 
from a conceptually parsimonious model that explains various 
complex forms of communication as its derivatives, they are simp-
ly not correct in many ordinary situations. Instead of treating 
argumentative discussions in terms of monistic illocutionary acts 
exchanged in dyadic dialogues, argumentation theory would be 
 
3 For a general speech act theoretic discussion, see Lewiński (2021a).  
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better served embracing illocutionary pluralism in argumentative 
polylogues. This, anyway, is the burden of proof I undertake here. 
And the way I aim to discharge this burden is as follows. First, in 
Section 2.1, I set up an incredibly easy target for my critique: 
models of speech act based argumentative dialogues as used by 
computer scientists. Of course, the theoretical underpinnings, 
goals, and applications of these models have little to do with 
speech act theory as such; yet, focussing just on the speech act 
aspect allows for the efficient capture of the simplifications that 
mar other speech act approaches to argumentation. Pragma-
dialectics, discussed in Section 2.2., is one such approach that for 
all its sophistication cannot quite overcome the conceptual limita-
tions identified in Section 2.1. In Section 3, I present Levinson’s 
challenge to monofunctional speech act models of dialogue, 
grounded in the assumption I call vertical illocutionary pluralism. 
Aided by this, in Section 4, I present a positive case for horizontal 
illocutionary pluralism in argumentative polylogues. The basic 
idea is very simple: when argumentatively interacting with more 
than one person at the same time (that’s the polylogue compo-
nent), we often convey more than one argumentatively relevant 
illocutionary force (that’s the illocutionary pluralism component). 
I demonstrate the workings of such complex argumentative ex-
changes on two ostensibly simple examples discussed, for some-
what different purposes, in literature on conversation and speech 
acts. I end in Section 5 by presenting a major advantage of illocu-
tionary pluralism in argumentative polylogues: it affords a better 
account of fallacious and otherwise manipulative discourse. 
2. Simple speech act exchanges in argumentative discussions 
2.1 The simplest model  
 
The simplest model combines the assumption of illocutionary 
monism and the dyadic reduction via theoretical and empirical 
simplification. Such is the case with the computational models of 
“multi-agent” argumentative dialogues as exemplarily developed 
by Prakken (2000, 2009), McBurney and Parsons (2009), and 
Reed and Budzyńska (2011). Arguably, these models are con-
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structed not to capture the complexity of natural argumentative 
interactions, but rather to provide a simple computational basis for 
artificial agents to engage in interactive forms of reasoning and 
deliberation. As such, these models successfully overcome some 
of the entrenched assumptions of formal reasoning—especially 
monologicity and monotonicity of deductive logic—and perhaps it 
is ingenuous to require them to take up further burden of proof that 
would endanger their computational feasibility. Still, recent claims 
regarding the capacity of such models to precisely grasp the com-
plexity of natural argumentative dialogues in context (e.g., 
Yaskorska-Shah 2021) warrant an objection that in terms of de-
scriptive adequacy they might be punching above their weight.  
I focus here exclusively on these computational models that 
take speech acts as central conceptual tools to understand argu-
mentation.4 Under what to purists is confusingly called “locution 
rules,” these models stipulate sets of argumentatively relevant 
illocutions: claim (or assert), argue (or justify), question, chal-
lenge, concede, or retract previous speech acts. These illocutions 
are unambiguously monofunctional: no issues of interpretation, 
 
4 Nonetheless, similar objections apply to the broader computational/argument 
mining programme (see, however, Musi and Aakhus (2018, 2019) for computa-
tional studies that challenge many of the usual limitations, notably the reliance 
on controlled monological or dyadic examples). Take for example the important 
contributions of Peldszus and Stede (2013, 2016). Empirically speaking, they 
use “monologue microtexts” as a basic corpus for mining argumentation struc-
tures from natural discourse. These texts are produced in response to yes/no 
questions such as “Should shopping malls be open on Sundays?” Matching this 
empirical set-up is a dyadic theoretical framework, where argumentation 
amounts to a dovetailed, even if expectedly competitive, production of two 
parties: the proponent who supports her central claim with arguments (and can 
further defend it with counterattacks) and the challenger who tries to rebut or 
undercut the proponent’s argumentation. By contrast, in the work on conversa-
tional organization of, for example, Roberts (2012), the standard question under 
discussion (QUD) is an open wh-question that does not partition the logical 
space into neat dichotomies as yes/no questions inevitably do, but rather into 
sets of plural and contrastive potential answers to the QUD. As I argued earlier 
(Lewiński 2017, 2019), in argumentative discourse each such answer can and 
indeed should be assessed via some form of pro-et-contra considerations, but 
this dyadic dialectic plays merely an auxiliary, instrumental role in a complex 
net of contrastive or comparative judgments (e.g., X is better than Y and Z with 
respect to c, but worse than Y and equal to Z with respect to d).  
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hearer-relative uptake, or indirectness are considered (let alone a 
full-blown illocutionary pluralism advocated below). While the 
sets of relevant illocutions can be extended by adding further 
refined categories, for example, by distinguishing between pure 
questioning, assertive questioning, and rhetorical questioning 
(Yaskorska-Shah 2021), the basic assumption that each of these 
speech acts does one argumentative job is left intact.   
Similar simplifications protect the dyadic assumption: the idea 
that argumentative exchanges happen between two and only two 
parties. Prakken does so explicitly by a theoretical fiat: apart from 
the proponent of a topic t and its opponent, “[t]he remaining par-
ticipants, if any, are the third parties with respect to t, assumed to 
be neutral towards t” (2009, p. 286; see Lewiński and Aakhus 
2014). Others do it by a fitting selection of the empirical material 
used; for example, a radio program with numerous presenters, 
panellists, witnesses, and audiences is analyzed in terms of a clear-
ly defined pro/con debate between two camps (Yaskorska-Shah 
2021, p. 5).5 Whatever the source of the reduction, the overall 
practice is to analyze schematic dyadic exchanges between Paul 
and Olga or Bob and Wilma, as in Reed and Budzyńska (2011):  
 
Bob: You know what? Harry was in Dundee. 
Wilma: How do you know? 
Bob: I saw him. 
 
Whereby Bob claims or asserts “Harry was in Dundee,” Wilma 
questions it, and Bob subsequently justifies or agues for it.   
Taken together, the assumptions of illocutionary monism and 
the dyadic reduction are at the very core of such “dialogue 
games.” And they need to be if feasible computational models are 
to be constructed. However, to a natural human speaker and inter-
preter they will remain just that, some contrived “games.” 
2.2 A complex model 
The examples in the previous section reflect the way in which 
many formal or quasi-formal models of argumentative dialogue 
 
5 For a telling contrast to such a reductive approach, see in-depth discourse 
analysis of radio programs in Bruxelles and Kerbrat-Orecchioni (2004).  
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resort to the concept of speech acts largely for taxonomic purposes 
(see also Hitchcock 2007; Walton and Krabbe 1995). Broad clas-
ses of speech acts—notably Searle’s (1975a) representa-
tives/assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declara-
tions—and more specific types of speech acts provide a good 
heuristic to capture the set of legal moves in a dialogue game, that 
is, to efficiently instantiate the “locution rules” of a dialogue. 
Further, they are also instrumental in defining “protocol rules,” 
which stipulate how arguments of one party can be questioned by 
the other party, how critical questions should be responded to with 
justifications or retractions, etc. Profound reflection into the na-
ture of speech acts, their functioning in communication and argu-
mentation and, indeed, in the social world as such, is beyond the 
scope of their interest. 
As is well known, pragma-dialectical theory is pragmatic pre-
cisely because it offers a much deeper integration of the speech act 
theory with a dialectical approach to argumentation (van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst 1984, 2004). When it was developed in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, it was capable of capturing many of the 
newly developed insights of the era and reworking them for the 
purpose of studying argumentation.6 As a result, the pragma-
dialectical approach to speech acts amounts to much more than a 
schematic application of the taxonomic resources of speech act 
theory (for an excellent summary, see Snoeck Henkemans 2014). 
One of its crucial innovations is to treat argumentation as an “illo-
cutionary act complex,” which is complex in three important 
respects (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, pp. 32-33): 
 
1) Arguing typically consists of more than one sentence. While 
classic speech act theory (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) routinely 
assigned illocutionary forces to one-sentence utterances (“I 
name this ship the Queen Elizabeth,” “Shoot her!”), argu-
 
6 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (1984) careful elaboration of the felicity 
conditions for the speech act of argumentation, discussion of the relations 
between the illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of speech acts and between 
their conventional and intentional features, as well as the distinction between 
the “recognition” and “correctness” conditions for speech acts, dialogue very 
well with the contemporary work of Bach and Harnish (1979), Grice (1975), 
and Searle (1975a, 1975b, Searle and Vanderveken 1985). 
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ments characteristically require more linguistic work, some-
times even an entire treatise. 
2) Further, “the sentences uttered in an argumentation in fact have 
two illocutionary forces simultaneously” (van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 1984, p. 32, italics in the original); when we ar-
gue, we also perform assertions, make claims, issue state-
ments, or offer hypotheses, all of which are themselves illocu-
tionary acts belonging to the class of assertives.  
3) Finally, for an illocution to have the force of argumentation, it 
has to be inferentially connected to another illocution, vari-
ously called a conclusion, expressed opinion, point of view, 
standpoint, thesis, or claim. The very point of making an ar-
gument is to provide reasoned support to (or refutation of) this 
other illocution.   
 
Crucial to the discussion here is point 2. Van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst clearly surpass the limits of simple illocutionary 
monism in the form of a one-sentence-to-one-illocutionary-force 
correlation. They do so by drawing a distinction between “elemen-
tary illocutions at sentence level” and “compound illocutions [i.e., 
illocutionary act complexes] at a higher textual level” (1984, pp. 
34-35).7 To understand the felicity conditions for the speech act of 
argumentation, that is, the general conditions under which argu-
mentation can justify the expressed opinion to the hearer’s satis-
faction, one needs to go beyond individual, sentence-based illocu-
tions and consider the higher textual level. This, in turn, is best 
achieved when argumentation is conceptualized in the context of a 
complete model of argumentative discussion. Accordingly, prag-
ma-dialectics offers an ideal model of a critical discussion, which 
theorizes all the argumentatively relevant speech acts that the 
speaker-qua-protagonist can trade with the hearer-qua-antagonist. 
Argumentation is in fact only one such speech act, central at the 
argumentation stage of a critical discussion. But other speech acts 
accompany argumentation: in the first place, the protagonist’s 
standpoint needs to be expressed by her and then doubted by the 
 
7 As directly discussed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, pp. 32-33), this 
is different from another recognized way for speech acts to have a dual illocu-
tionary force, namely, via indirect speech acts (Searle 1975b). See also Berme-
jo-Luque (2011, p. 60) and Section 3 below. 
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antagonist at the confrontation stage. Further, the antagonist needs 
to challenge the protagonist to defend the standpoint, and both 
need to agree on premises and discussion rules at the opening 
stage. At the argumentation stage, while the protagonist advances 
argumentation, the antagonist can ask critical questions and re-
quest further arguments. Finally, at the conclusion stage, the pro-
tagonist can uphold or retract her standpoint (van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 1984, pp. 95-118; 2004, pp. 62-68). This distribution 
of speech acts across the stages of a critical discussion resembles 
the protocols of dialogue games mentioned above, especially when 
pragma-dialecticians specify them with the help of dialectical 
profiles (van Eemeren, Houtlosser, and Snoeck Henkemans, 
2008). 
A similar yet original approach has been developed by Berme-
jo-Luque (2011). She too considers argumentation to be a complex 
speech act layered over other basic illocutions. These basic illocu-
tions—typically assertive speech acts, but also, possibly, promises, 
requests, or pieces of advice—constitute “first order speech-acts” 
by means of which “second order speech acts” of argumentation 
are performed (Bermejo-Luque 2011, p. 60). Further, Bermejo-
Luque theorizes that argumentation is inescapably built out of two 
interrelated “second order” illocutions, namely, the speech-act of 
adducing reasons and the speech-act of concluding. These second 
order illocutionary forces are thus performed simultaneously with 
first order forces and are nested together with them in the complex 
speech act of argumentation.8 
Such theories thus offer a nuanced approach to illocutions that 
acknowledges their complexity in the context of argumentative 
discussions. In particular, in their unique ways they recognize the 
duality of illocutionary forces performed in argument-making. 
This duality is, however, a feature of the analytic apparatus of the 
theory, a feature particularly conspicuous in pragma-dialectics. 
Once “normatively reconstructed” for the purposes of argument 
analysis and evaluation, each speech act has one and only one 
unique function in the broader critical discussion. As a result, all 
 
8 Bermejo-Luque (2011) further elaborates her speech act theory of argumenta-
tion by resorting to Bach and Harnish’s (1979) speech-act schema (SAS).  
430 Lewiński 
 
© Marcin Lewiński. Informal Logic, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021), pp. 421–451. 
“dialectically-relevant moves” are, again, clearly determined 
mono-functional units.  
Moreover, the context of the discussion is exclusively dyadic: 
“The pragma-dialectical argumentation theory assumes that, in 
principle, argumentative language use is always part of an ex-
change of views between two parties that do not hold the same 
opinion, even when the exchange of views takes place by way of a 
monologue” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 59, italics 
added).9 This form of the dyadic reduction is characteristic of any 
dialectical approach to argumentation and is both theoretically and 
historically traceable to the fact that the disputing dyad (question-
er-answerer, proponent-opponent) is in fact a dialectical analogue 
of the basic truth values: truth and falsity (Lewiński 2019; see also 
Dutilh Novaes 2020). While theoretically understandable for the 
normative purpose of dialogically verifying the validity of reason-
ing departing from true premisses, this reductive dialectical ap-
proach cannot be claiming in parallel that it is capturing the mech-
anisms of actual argumentative discussions, even with a rather 
complex application of speech act theory. It is a category mistake 
to confuse the normative dyadic order of truth verification with the 
descriptive, (possibly) polyadic order of actual argumentative 
dynamics.  
In short, despite the nuances of pragma-dialectics and Bermejo-
Luque’s linguistic-pragmatic approach, the assumptions of illocu-
tionary monism and the dyadic reduction are left largely intact.  
3. Levinson’s challenge  
The basic form of illocutionary pluralism recognized early in the 
development of speech act theory is the one involved in indirect 
speech acts whereby a locutionarily direct but illocutionarily 
secondary speech act is a means to perform a locutionarily indirect 
 
9 For a detailed analysis of various pragma-dialectical strategies for bringing 
discourse that involves more than two parties into this dyadic mold, see Lew-
iński and Aakhus 2014. One such strategy is distinguishing between an overtly 
addressed but secondary audience—a mere messenger of sorts (e.g., a journalist 
interviewing a politician)—and an unaddressed but still primary audience that 
constitutes the actual antagonist of the speaker (e.g., swing voters the inter-
viewed politician aims to persuade; van Eemeren 2010, p. 109).  
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but illocutionarily primary speech act; via familiar conventions, a 
question such as “Can you pass me the salt?” functions primarily 
as a request to pass the salt (Searle 1975b). Since it links illocu-
tionary acts via an instrumental by-means-of relation, this form of 
pluralism can be called vertical. While classic examples involve 
only two levels, longer chains of instrumental relations among 
speech acts are possible too. 
This has been a continuous topic of interest for Levinson. Al-
ready in his early empirical work on speech acts, Levinson 
claimed that “utterance units often seem to involve more than one 
speech act in a number of different ways,” with indirect speech 
acts providing “simple examples” of this (Levinson 1981, p. 476). 
But this point generalizes based on the idea that “the multiplicity 
of simultaneous functions is really an assignment of more than one 
intention to the utterance” (Levinson 1981, p. 477). Further, inten-
tions are often finely layered, thus generating “a sequence predict-
ed by a hierarchical structure of goals” (Levinson, 1981, p. 486). 
One curious fact about indirect speech acts, such as “Can you pass 
me the salt?,” is that they can receive both literal uptake as a ques-
tion (“Actually, I can’t, someone just took it away”) and indirect 
uptake as a request (“Here you are!”). However, under proper 
circumstances, responses such as,  
 
You’re not going to drink more tequila, are you!?  
It’s pretty salty, actually, have you tried yet?  
 
would be perfectly in order. Hearers can thus also respond to the 
speakers’ perlocutionary objects of given speech acts (that is, 
perlocutionary effects intended by the speakers, see Austin 1962, 
p. 117)—or, indeed, to broader action sequences they may (rightly 
or wrongly) ascribe to speakers.   
To account for such complexities, in his recent work Levinson 
develops the concept of conversational projects: 
 
The notion of project we need for action ascription is not ‘themat-
ic thread’ but ‘plan of action’—that is, a course of action that at 
least one participant is pursuing, which may at first be opaque to 
others then retrospectively discernible […] and then prospectively 
projectable. (Levinson 2013, p. 122)  
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The crucial point is that in conversation, speakers orient to each 
other’s projects:  
 
Clearly, in conversation, projects are interactionally negotiated, 
jointly launched, diverted or aborted. Actions then are in the ser-
vice of projects, and projects are themselves actions to accom-
plish. That is why there is no simple answer to what action this 
turn is doing: it is doing something local, which governs its re-
sponse types, but also part of something more global, which, as 
soon as it is recognizable, also plays a role in fashioning responses 
(as in the ‘go ahead’ or ‘blocking’ responses to pre-s). In short, 
there is a hierarchy of actions within a project. (Levinson 2013, 
pp. 126-127) 
 
To demonstrate the working of conversational projects, Levin-
son analyzes the following exchange between a teenage daughter, 
Virginia, and her mom:   
 
12 Vir: But - you know, you have to have enough mo:ney?, I think 
13 ten dollars ’ ud be good. 
14 (0.4) 
15 Mom: .hhh Ten dollahs a week? 
16 Vir: Mm hm. 
17 Mom: Just to throw away? 
18 (0.5) 
19 Vir: Not to throw away, to spe:nd. 
20 (.) 
21 Mom: ((shrilly)) On [WHAT? That ’ s what I been tryin ’ a fi 
nd = 
22 Pr?: [eh hih hih 
23 Mom: = out. besides McDo:nalds?, 
 
Mom’s “Ten dollahs a week?” (line 15) is ostensibly locally a 
clarification question (per week or per month?) to a proposal for 
more money; but also, querying the amount produces an oppor-
tunity for daughter Virginia to justify the amount, where, if those 
justifications prove inadequate, grounds are thereby provided for 
rejecting the proposal. Virginia’s project, asking for more pocket 
money (earlier more clothes), is countered by Mom’s project of 
holding the status quo. Other-initiated repair, an information re-
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quest, a challenge to produce reasons, a pre-accusation and thus 
likely refusal to grant the request, are all visible in the one turn. 
(Levinson 2013, pp. 126-127) 
 
In discussing Levinson’s nuanced approach to action ascription 
in conversational activities (see also Levinson 1979, 1981), Sbisà 
identifies his speech act pluralism with “the plural potentialities of 
sequential positioning” (2013, p. 239) for speech acts in conversa-
tion. We thus have a certain possible sequence of acts more or less 
rationally and recognizably linked in an overarching project, a 
sequence we can possibly project from any speech act utterance in 
conversation. This is a flexible and sophisticated approach to 
vertical plurality far exceeding the limits of Searle’s conventional 
approach, both in the way ascriptions are made and in their com-
plexity (2 vs. n-levels). This goes quite some way to undermining 
the possible counterargument of classical speech act theory that 
illocutionary pluralism is not so important because it can be, in the 
end, explained away by the tools developed in the theory’s salad 
days: chiefly, the concept of indirect illocutionary forces. Howev-
er, it is still a vertical model; it is based on a projection of various 
illocutionary forces (and, further, perlocutionary objects) linked in 
a “by way of” or “by means of” manner to the literally uttered act 
through some kind of sequential hierarchy.  
For someone like Levinson, genuinely attentive to the interac-
tive dynamics of actual conversations, some form of speech act 
pluralism is a natural feature of our communication. Its dismissal 
is indeed one of the “essential inadequacies of the speech act 
models of dialogue” (Levinson 1981) that cannot be easily over-
come if an empirically adequate description of communicative 
reality is one of its avowed goals. Instead of developing dialogue 
models in terms of fixed sets of rules applying over a fixed set of 
uniform speech act types, an approach sensitive to a hierarchically 
organized, context-dependent, and possibly strategic, goal-
structure of each speaker’s conversational projects should be 
adopted (Levinson 1979, 1981, 2013). 
This has not escaped the attention of argumentation scholars. 
Indeed, Jackson and Jacobs’s work on conversational argument 
implements a very similar, flexible, and dynamic approach (Jack-
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son and Jacobs, 1980; Jacobs and Jackson, 1981, 1989; for insight-
ful discussion, see Jacobs 1989 and Snoeck Henkemans 2014). In 
their view, a simple rule-governed level of analysis that under-
stands argumentative speech acts in terms of structural units of 
conversation, and even a more sophisticated approach of the early 
speech act theory that views them as conventionally recognized, 
functional entities, should give way to the analysis focused on 
what they call a rational level of discourse organization, oriented 
precisely to speakers’ complex plans organized via practical rea-
soning in a given context of activity (Jacobs and Jackson 1989; 
Jacobs 1989; Jackson 1992). On such an account, the discursive 
manifestations and the felicity conditions of the speech act of 
arguing vary across activities and arguers’ objectives. Next to 
paradigmatic assertoric arguments advanced by the protagonist (as 
analyzed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst), one can distinguish 
hypothetical arguments, devil’s advocacy, arguments constructed 
collaboratively by the protagonist and the antagonist, third-party 
arguments, and even arguments made solely for the purpose of 
demonstrating a speaker’s beliefs without any genuine attempt at 
rationally persuading the doubters and objectors. Overall, 
“[i]nstead of an isolable and homogeneous speech act, one finds a 
family of act types that vary in function and pragmatic logic de-
pending upon the context of their use and the form of their expres-
sion” (Jacobs 1989, p. 350). 
Considered from this perspective, the simple approach of com-
puter scientists based on a schematically rule-governed, taxonomic 
understanding of speech act theory grounded in the assumption of 
illocutionary monism is a far cry from the logic of actual conversa-
tion. In addition, while most of Jackson and Jacobs’s examples are 
still prototypically dyadic—most often, they involve a couple 
arguing in the private comfort of their car, their kitchen, or over 
the phone—their speech act approach extends to genuine multi-
party events, such as mediation sessions, group arguments among 
friends, or public speeches on campus. This means that the dyadic 
reduction is not explicitly imposed by theoretical fiats or oppor-
tune data selection—but neither are the theoretical consequences 
of examining polylogical argumentation consistently drawn. 
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4. Plural speech acts in a polylogue  
In my constructive response to such complexities of actual argu-
mentation, I start from challenging the dyadic reduction. In princi-
ple, illocutionary pluralism and polylogue are independent of one 
another: a speaker can intentionally and conventionally perform a 
plural illocution even in a dyadic context. Elsewhere, I described 
dilemmatic deliberations and strategic (illocutionary) ambiguity as 
two instances of this (Lewiński 2021a). While such complex dyad-
ic strategies exist, a prototypical case of illocutionary pluralism is 
in the context of a polylogue—and, vice versa, a typical polylogue 
is very likely to generate illocutionarily plural speech acts.  
Polylogue, in its simplest form, is a conversation that involves 
more than two people (Lewiński 2014). However, typical argu-
mentative polylogues are complex activities in which multiple 
players discuss their distinct, and often incompatible, positions 
across a variety of places (Aakhus and Lewiński 2017). Online 
discussions, political debates among liberals, socialists, and con-
servatives, or public controversies over climate change and energy 
production are all cases of polylogues. Polylogue is thus both a 
natural form of complex communication ordinary speakers are 
competent in from very young age (see Tomasello 2008) and an 
open framework from which various aspects of complex argumen-
tation can be consistently studied. 
One key characteristic of polylogues from a speech act perspec-
tive is that each speaker engages in a speech activity with more 
than one hearer (see also Clark and Carlson 1982). This seemingly 
innocuous fact has the potential to turn speech act theory on its 
head. To start with, the whole communicative transaction—the 
speaker’s complex intention (that involves at least the locutionary 
intention to mean something, the illocutionary intention to perform 
a socially recognizable conventional act, the perlocutionary inten-
tion to influence the hearers, and the communicative intention to 
have these intentions recognized by the hearers) and the hearers’ 
uptake—cannot be described anymore as a dyadic affair. A speak-
er might skillfully distribute her intentions differently to various 
hearers. Via one unique utterance, such as “Next time you do this, 
papa will start reading boring argumentation books as your bed-
time stories!,” a mother might be uncompromisingly scolding her 
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beloved child, while inviting her partner to live up to the child-
bearing consensus they reached. Further, there is not just a simple 
“common ground” between the dyad of the speaker and the hearer, 
but rather various “shared grounds” of the subsets of participants, 
next to the one common to all of them. A child might not, and 
perhaps even should not, be privy to the discussions and agree-
ments her parents have. As a result, the whole scheme of mono-
functional social activities understood as isolated games in which 
monofunctional moves directed at one unique other player are 
performed pretty much collapses. 
Take a simple case of a (pre-COVID face-to-face) academic 
conference: apart from, let us hope, some knowledge sharing and 
testing, it is a social activity rife with image management, job 
seeking, friends making, flirting, etc. A competent social agent 
knows she is playing different games at the same time. The result 
of it is that, as aptly put by McGowan, “a single act can also sim-
ultaneously be a move in two (or even more) different norm-
governed activities” (2019, p. 96). Importantly, however, for 
McGowan these acts would be most naturally “parallel acts,” akin 
to Bach and Harnish’s “collateral acts” (1979, pp. 96-107)10 but 
defined by some rules of the game rather than a speaker’s inten-
tion. In an academic question and answer session, I can, for in-
stance, advise a colleague to look into a certain body of literature 
(illocutionary act) and, simultaneously and often unbeknownst to 
me, via the same words pronounced make someone win a bet 
(“Didn’t I tell you he’s gonna quote Foucault again?!”), or make 
the chair intervene with “we agreed questions be kept short!” 
(parallel acts). The picture we have here is one of a plurality of 
acts realized by speech and composed of a single illocutionary act 
accompanied by multiple (possible) parallel acts. 
 
10 Bach and Harnish (1979) distinguish between proper speech acts, character-
ized by the communicative presumption, namely, the presumption that when a 
speaker says something, she is saying it with “some recognizable illocutionary 
intent” (1979, p. 7) and collateral acts, “conversational acts performed in con-
junction with or in lieu of illocutionary acts” (1979, p. 97). Collateral acts can 
be overt (e.g., joking or storytelling) or covert (e.g., innuendos or deliberate 
ambiguities); the latter “succeed (the intention with which they are performed is 
fulfilled) only if their intent is not recognized, or at least not recognized as 
intended to be recognized” (Bach and Harnish 1979, p. 101). 
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But the argument I want to make here is precisely that the plu-
rality can consist in a plurality of fully-fledged speech acts with 
overt illocutionary forces. To illustrate this, let me move directly 




Imagine good old pre-COVID-19 days where a philosopher, 
Mr. X, comments in person on a conference paper of another 
philosopher, Mr. Y. At a conference dinner, having a one-on-one 
cigarette with the author, Mr. Y, X says: 
  
1.1 This was the best paper of the Argumentation and 
Speech Acts 2021 Conference I’ve seen.  
 
Assuming that “this” refers to Y’s paper, of all things imagina-
ble, this is a compliment, and a felicitous one: it expresses praise 
over the hearer’s characteristics, actions, products, or possessions 
that are considered undeniably praiseworthy, especially if these are 
rare or unique (see Aakhus and Aldrich 2002). Sacks (1992) calls 
such compliments “safe” and “strong”; they make the only ad-
dressee, Y, feel good and risk hardly anything for X. We do not 
feel anything much about them, this is just a part of the social 
academic business, full of strategic niceties, etc.  
Now, for contrast, imagine a philosopher, Mr. X, commenting 
on a conference paper of Mr. Y. During his commentary in a 
conference room with quite a few other scholars present, X says: 
  
1.2 This was the best paper of the Argumentation and 
Speech Acts 2021 Conference I’ve seen.  
 
So it happens that X is a member of a panel evaluating papers 
for a prize. He’s had quite a few discussions about it with two 
other panel members present in the room. One of them, A, had all 
along claimed Y’s paper is weak beyond discussion. The other, B, 
staunchly defended it. X was hesitant (“Let’s wait and see the last 
version…”). Beyond this complication, X’s colleague C who 
yesterday was a little bit too smart—arrogant, even—in discussing 
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his paper is also in the room. X knows the trade of academic di-
plomacy and has the following illocutionary intentions issued with 
an overt communicative intention, namely, an intention for these 
illocutionary intentions to be recognized as intended11: 
 
a) Compliment Y. 
b) Externalize a difference of opinion with A.  
c) Concede an argument (and perhaps also agree on the con-
clusion) of B.  
d) Rank C’s work as inferior. 
 
Finally, he might also, whether deliberately or inadvertently: 
 
e) Denigrate, offend, or insult C, as well as other audience 
members whose natural reaction could well be: “How 
about my paper you attended earlier today? You think it 
was dumb, huh?” 
 
Because of possibilities d) and e), Sacks (1992) called such 
compliments in a multi-party conversation “unsafe” given that 
being comparative ascriptions of personal qualities or achieve-
ments, while complimenting one person, they might also insult or 
offend another. 
The question is: Which illocutionary act has Mr. X performed? 
To start with, option e) would, on the most standard analysis, be 
considered a perlocutionary effect rather than an illocutionary 
 
11 See Grice (1957, 1975), Strawson (1964), Bach and Harnish (1979). Else-
where (Lewiński 2021a) I called such intentional performance of plural illocu-
tionary forces “illocutionary pluralism proper” in contradistinction to “illocu-
tionary relativism,” which instead relies on a plural ascription of various illocu-
tionary forces by different hearers, possibly in a way entirely unintended by the 
speaker (cf. Sbisà 2013; Johnson 2019). This is an important qualification. 
Especially in polylogical argumentation over social media, each claim and 
argument can be reported, reused, and relayed beyond a speaker’s control and 
even knowledge. In this process, quite expectedly, a plurality of different 
illocutionary forces can be attributed to the speaker (e.g., Donald Trump: 
“recommended that bleach be used to treat COVID-19” vs. “inquired whether 
bleach could be used to treat COVID-19” vs. “joked that bleach be used to treat 
COVID-19”). While fascinating, these phenomena are not directly addressed 
here. 
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act—either a perlocutionary object intended by X, or a perlocu-
tionary sequel, unintended but nevertheless caused by X’s illocu-
tion (see Austin 1962, pp. 117-118). Let us then focus on a-d here. 
As a first approximation of an answer, let me now organize this 
via a somewhat pedantic speech act analysis:  
 
Level 1: By way of an assertion (assertive): “This was the best pa-
per of the Argumentation and Speech Acts 2021 Conference I’ve 
seen.”  
 
Level 2: X is complimenting Y (another assertive),12 by way of 
which he is:  
 
Level 3:  
1) Externalizing a difference of opinion with A.  
(On the pragma-dialectical reading of “mixed” argumentative 
disputes by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 2004), this 
would be both an assertive of the confrontation stage, that of 
expressing X’s standpoint, and a commissive of the same 
stage, namely, non-acceptance of A’s standpoint.) 
2) Conceding an argument (and perhaps also agreeing on the 
conclusion) of B.  
(Again, for pragma-dialecticians, this would be a commissive 
of the argumentation or the concluding stage: acceptance of ar-
gumentation or of a standpoint, respectively.)   
3) Ranking C’s work as inferior. 
(A curious speech act; in Searle’s taxonomy, likely a mix of 
assertive/representative and declarative speech acts, as in the 
subclass of “representative declarations” [1975a, pp. 360-361]. 
For Austin, this would be a clear case of a “verdictive” speech 
act [1962, pp. 152-154] of a rather informal kind. In argumen-
tation, given the comparative “better than” relation inherent in 
ranking, it can be an act of stating a key premise of a complex 
 
12 According to Searle and Vanderveken, similarly to complaining and boasting, 
complimenting can be “either an assertive or an expressive” illocutionary act 
(1985, pp. 213-215). The exclusive disjunction here (“either…or…”) indicates 
that there are two mutually exclusive versions of these acts, depending largely 
on the propositional content: one assertive (as in example 1.2), another expres-
sive (“I was totally amazed by your talk!”). Thus, Searle and Vanderveken’s 
account preserves the assumption of illocutionary monism.  
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practical argument [Lewiński 2017] supporting a conclusion: 
“Y [and not C, etc.] should win the best essay prize”). 
 
Now, the key point here is the following: Mr. X performs a simple 
one-sentence locution in a well-defined social activity of a confer-
ence commentary. But this unique locution is a polylogical contri-
bution: it intentionally acts on interactions with a number of other 
participants in the event and it does so in a way that is convention-
ally recognized. As such, it performs a number of parallel illocu-
tionary acts. Since this includes multiple argumentative illocution-
ary acts at the same level (level 3 as described above), I call this 
form of pluralism horizontal illocutionary pluralism in contrast to 
vertical pluralism constituted by hierarchical relations among 
illocutions (level 1-3 here; see Section 3). For pragma-
dialecticians, that would likely mean Mr. X is having a number of 
dyadic critical discussions with different antagonists at the same 
time. Think of a chess master playing simultaneously against 
multiple opponents on different boards: what happens on one 
board or in one discussion stays in that discussion. But this would 
precisely be the form of dyadic reduction that renders a description 
(and evaluation!) of actual argumentative activities utterly inade-
quate. We have one board here—one communicative event—and 
so what happens in one discussion obviously “leaks” to another; 
for example, X is now in a discursive coalition with B, thus consti-
tuting a collective antagonist against A’s standpoint. They now 
have a majority and thus an upper hand in their collective delibera-
tion with A. Socially speaking, X might be encouraging the hum-
ble Y and publicly defending her praiseworthy work against con-
stant denigrations of boastful C, etc., etc.  





This example has been discussed in McGowan’s (2018, 2019) 
recent work on exercitive speech acts. Her original analysis had a 
different purpose, namely, that of demonstrating how conversa-
tional contributions can enact new, activity-specific norms, thus 
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altering the activity’s normative status. For example, after Jane’s 
question, “Is Ralph eligible?,” the department members cannot, 
among other things, completely ignore Ralph as a potential de-
partment chair (at the very least, they are expected to justify why 
he is not eligible, should this be the case). On McGowan’s well-
known analysis, such acts thus constitute conversational exerci-
tives: speech acts that, following Austin (1962), are exercitives 
“since they enact facts about what is permissible in some realm,” 
and, moreover, “they are conversational exercitives since the 
realm in question is a particular conversation” (McGowan 2019, p. 
34). 
Imagine a department meeting of the type described by Lew-
iński and Aakhus (2014). Peter is a white male full professor and 
chair of the philosophy department. Jane is a recently hired young 
assistant professor, and while she is white, she is the only woman 
in the department. Ralph is a long-time permanent instructor and 
the only person of colour in the department.   
 
PETER: We really need to figure this out. I am stepping down as 
chair at the end of this year and someone really needs to step 
up. Nobody wants to do it but someone has to. 
[Awkward silence.] 
JANE: Well, I know that I am not eligible to be chair. I just got 
here and I don’t have tenure but is Ralph eligible? 
[Long awkward silence.] 
JANE: [with her hands in the air] I am just trying to be clear on 
the eligibility conditions so we can be sure that we are consid-
ering all of our options. I am not sure that this would be of in-
terest [turns to Ralph sitting alongside wall] to you, Ralph, but 
if it does and we could make it happen, it would be good for 
everyone—especially given that no one else seems to want to 
do it! 
[Many slightly reluctant nods in the room] 
PETER: Ahh, well we’ll come back to this. 
(McGowan 2018, p. 192; 2019, pp. 186-187) 
  
Along with McGowan, let us focus here on Jane’s question, “Is 
Ralph eligible?” On the most straightforward speech act interpre-
tation, this is a real, informative question, as is also ostensibly 
confirmed in Jane’s follow-up (“I am just trying to be clear on the 
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eligibility conditions”). But here it comes as a response to Peter’s 
act of soliciting proposals, a speech act typical of deliberative 
argumentation (Corredor 2020; Lewiński 2021b). This solicitation 
of proposals has also a very specific nature here: Peter’s opening 
can be glossed as “any volunteers?” because the person to be 
proposed needs to be a current department member, that is, belong 
to the group present in that very meeting. At this juncture, Jane 
seems to be reasoning along the lines of a disjunctive syllogism: 
the next chair “has to” be chosen from among us, Peter will not 
continue, “nobody [else] wants to do it,”13 and “I [Jane] am not 
eligible to be chair.” So, we might just get down to Ralph.  
This interpretation makes it seem as though Jane’s reasoning is 
tinged with identifying an eliminative, last-resort option, some-
thing McGowan is actually out to challenge with this example. 
However, given the contextual background, Jane at least presents 
Ralph as an option to consider in the first place. So, over and 
above the innocent question (and in spite of her disingenuous 
disclaimer, “I am just trying to be clear on the eligibility condi-
tions”), Jane is performing a speech act that elsewhere I called a 
conversational nomination: a speaker picks out one of the mem-
bers of the interacting group as having certain attributes relevant to 
the contextual task at hand (Lewiński 2021a). Admittedly, in this 
context, Jane is doing it via what conversational analysts call a 
pre-sequence or what speech act theorists can simply call an indi-
rect speech act—she is asking about one of the basic felicity con-
ditions (namely, a preparatory condition) for a successful proposal; 
in this institutional setting, one cannot propose an ineligible candi-
date. Still, similarly to many other recognizable indirect speech 
acts, doing so often just counts as performing the primary speech 
act, which is, here, that of issuing a proposal.14 Further in the 
 
13 Notice a quantifier domain restriction (Stanley and Szabó 2000): in Peter’s 
opening remark, “nobody” is likely restricted to “nobody you would routinely 
consider to be our department chair; likely, a white, male, full professor.” 
14 Compare: “Oh, I hurt my arm, someone else has to drive.” Asking in this 
context, “Does Ralph have a driving license?” just counts as a request for Ralph 
to drive (if indeed he does). Admittedly, it would be even stronger if the nega-
tive variants of these questions were asked: “Isn’t Ralph eligible?,” “Doesn’t 
Ralph have a driving license?” as these are moving more in the direction of 
rhetorical questions with an obvious answer. 
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exchange, she discharges the initial burden of proof for her pro-
posal (see Kauffeld 1998) by judiciously counterbalancing the 
negative, eliminative reason (“no one else seems to want to do it”) 
with a positive reason (“it would be good for everyone”).  
Given the context of practical argumentation within a delibera-
tive activity (Corredor 2020; Lewiński 2021b), Jane’s indirect 
proposal is thus the main speech act performed by way of her 
asking a question that constitutes a conversational nomination. 
But, also, given that Ralph is present in that meeting, and given 
Jane’s follow up where she directly addresses him as “you, 
Ralph,” “Is Ralph eligible?” also functions as an act of daring, 
encouraging, or challenging Ralph to run for the office, all of 
which seem to be straightforward illocutionary acts.   
In terms of pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, Jane’s 
question can also be attributed a number of simultaneously valid 
illocutionary forces. It can be seen as expressing a standpoint, and, 
as McGowan recognizes, a rather surprising or even provocative 
one (confrontation stage). It can also be seen as a challenge to the 
implicitly standing, conventionally expected standpoint that it 
should be a white, male, full professor. What Jane is conveying 
can be read as: “Why don’t you instead consider someone out of 
the box for once.” She might also be seen as adding a common 
starting point to their deliberative discussion (opening stage): 
“long-time, Afro-American instructors are eligible to be depart-
ment chairs too.” Yet another option is counter-argumentation at 
the argumentation stage: “Contrary to what you might think, Ralph 
is formally eligible too (so why not consider him).” As in previous 
examples, these different illocutionary forces are not merely dif-
ferent plausible interpretations of Jane’s speech act; they might all 
be intended by her as conventionally recognizable acts performed 
to different department members present in the room. Or she might 
be engaging in strategic illocutionary ambiguity (see Lewiński 
2021a) that lets her engage in plausible deniability if pressed, 
which is something she already pre-empts by saying, “I am just 
trying to be clear.”  
All of these are cases of illocutionary pluralism in an argumen-
tative polylogue.  
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5. Conclusion: Speech act pluralism and fallacies  
The analytic and evaluative advantages of speech act pluralism for 
argumentation theory are yet to be fully understood. It is a com-
plex issue in itself since, in a proper sense, speech act pluralism 
extends across three axes, namely, locutionary pluralism, dealing 
mostly with classic issues of semantic underdetermination and 
contextuality of meaning (Cappelen and Lepore 2005); illocution-
ary pluralism discussed here (see also Sbisà 2013; Johnson 2019; 
Lewiński 2021a); and perlocutionary pluralism investigating 
cognitive and behavioural effects of language use on hearers and 
especially manipulations of language generating underhand perlo-
cutionary effects. This last issue would properly belong to an area 
of cognitive linguistics, and cognitive pragmatics in particular (see 
de Saussure 2018; Schumann, Zufferey, and Oswald 2019, 2021; 
Lombardi Valauri et al. 2020; Müller 2020 for good recent exam-
ples). Only having fully accounted for these three forms of plural-
ism would we be able to satisfactorily realize Austin’s original 
postulate to fully elucidate “[t]he total speech act in the total 
speech situation” (Austin 1962, p. 147).  
Here, I merely sketched an account of illocutionary pluralism in 
argumentative discussions. But even with this limited account, 
some advances in argumentation theory can be made. One peren-
nial paradox in the theory is how to account for the fact that falla-
cies are argumentative moves that are, at the same time, irrational 
and convincing (Hamblin 1970). This paradox is evident in the 
context of two important considerations. First, as empirical evi-
dence consistently indicates, ordinary arguers are quite skilful at 
detecting and rejecting fallacious argumentation (van Eemeren, 
Garssen, and Meuffels 2009; Schumann, Zufferey, and Oswald 
2019, 2021). Second, should we think of fallacies exclusively in 
the context of dyadic discussions, would not the victim of a fallacy 
be the first to point out the abuse and to insist on its correction 
(Casey 2020)? A convincing fallacy sounds like an oxymoron.  
One possible interpretation of this is that fallacies, and especial-
ly fallacies such as the straw man fallacy, resort to fine, manipula-
tive, linguistic devices in order to appear reasonable, while they 
are not (Lewiński and Oswald 2013; Müller 2020; Schumann, 
Zufferey, and Oswald 2019, 2021). There exists, in speech act 
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theory terms, some deceitful relation between the locutionary form 
and the perlocutionary effects of fallacious speech acts. But anoth-
er interpretation, recently entertained in the field (Aikin and Talis-
se 2019; Casey 2020; de Saussure 2018), is that fallacies succeed 
in being treacherously convincing while being irrational because 
the context of argumentative discussion is not dyadic but, as I 
would call it, polyadic. Ad hominem, ad baculum, and straw man 
fallacies succeed not because they aim to gain recognition from 
the attacked opponent—the first to detect the abuse and express 
indignation—but rather from the larger ring of other participants 
and onlookers. They let the abuser present himself as a smarter, 
wittier, and altogether more potent reasoner than his victim who, 
in turn, is either silenced, thus letting the abuser’s argument pre-
vail before others, or burdened with the tedious task of rectifying 
the abuse. The challenge to the dyadic reduction, and hence the 
embracing of a polylogue, is thus the condition of possibility for 
this promising account. But how about illocutionary pluralism? It 
is very likely, but not strictly necessary. As just mentioned, some 
perfidious effects might trade on the complex relations between 
the locutionary and perlocutionary aspects of fallacious speech 
acts, this including purely perlocutionary effects on the audience. 
Yet, an illocutionary variant is certainly plausible. For instance, 
when in a public context, X is responding to Y’s argumentation 
with an ad hominem argument; she is performing a (fallacious) 
speech act of counter-argumentation vis-à-vis Y: “How can you be 
that naïve to even suspect Biden might have won?! Don’t you have 
eyes to see all the vote-rigging?” Vis-à-vis the larger audience, 
however, this illocutionary act simultaneously constitutes an act of 
ranking Y as not being cognitively competent enough to engage in 
critical argumentative exchanges. This interpretation, while sur-
prisingly in line with the pragma-dialectical take on ad hominem 
(it violates the attacked arguer’s freedom to engage in a critical 
discussion; see van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 2004), does 
require illocutionary pluralism. In the present scenario, the abuser 
X does not aim to rationally convince the victim Y of Y’s own 
cognitive deficiencies, nor even to do it in some covert, under-
hand, perlocutionary way. Instead, the abuser tries to convince 
others of it and does so in an overt, intentionally and conventional-
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ly recognized, and thus illocutionary fashion: “I hereby want you 
to recognize she’s really not up to it.” 
All this requires further careful investigation.15 One thing, 
however, is undeniable: the long-time relation between argumenta-
tion theory and speech act theory is a treasure trove that continues 
to deliver. 
Acknowledgements  
This work has been supported by the Portuguese Foundation for 
Science and Technology (FCT) and CHIST-ERA Programme via 
the project CHIST-ERA/0002/2019.  
References 
Aakhus, M. and A. Aldrich. 2002. Crafting communication activity: 
Understanding felicity in “I wish I…” compliments. Research on 
Language and Social Interaction 35(4): 395-425. 
Aakhus, M. and M. Lewiński. 2017. Advancing polylogical analysis of 
large-scale argumentation: Disagreement management in the fracking 
controversy. Argumentation 31(1): 179–207.  
Aikin, S. and R. Talisse. 2019. Why we argue: A guide to disagreement 
in an age of unreason. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge. 
Austin, J. L. 1962. How to do things with words. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.  
Bach, K. and R. Harnish. 1979. Linguistic communication and speech 
acts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Bermejo-Luque, L. 2011. Giving reasons: A linguistic-pragmatic ap-
proach to argumentation theory. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Bruxelles, S. and C. Kerbrat-Orecchioni. 2004. Coalitions in polylogues. 
Journal of Pragmatics 36(1): 75-113. 
Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore. 2005. Insensitive semantics. A defense of 
semantic minimalism and speech act pluralism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Casey, J. P. 2020. The persuasive force of the ad baculum. In Proceed-
ings OSSA 12: Evidence, Persuasion & Diversity, Windsor, ON: OS-
SA Conference Archive.  
 
15 Elsewhere (Lewiński 2021a), I show how illocutionary pluralism in the 
context of polylogue works behind a number of other forms of manipulative 
discourse discussed in the recent speech act literature, for example, back-door 
speech acts (Langton 2018) and dog-whistles (Saul 2018). 
Speech Act Pluralism in Argumentative Polylogues 447 
 
© Marcin Lewiński. Informal Logic, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021), pp. 421–451. 
Clark, H. H. and T. B. Carlson. 1982. Hearers and speech acts. Lan-
guage 58(2): 332-373.  
Corredor, C. 2020. Deliberative speech acts: An interactional approach. 
Language & Communication 71: 136-148. 
Davidson, D. 1973. Radical interpretation. Dialectica 27(3-4): 313-328. 
Dennett, D. C. 1971. Intentional systems. The Journal of Philosophy 
68(4): 87-106. 
Dutilh Novaes, C. 2020. The dialogical roots of deduction. Historical, 
cognitive, and philosophical perspectives on reasoning. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press. 
Eemeren, F. H. van. 2010. Strategic maneuvering in argumentative 
discourse: Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumenta-
tion. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Eemeren, F. H. van, B. Garssen and H. L. M. Meuffels. 2009. Fallacies 
and judgments of reasonableness: Empirical research concerning the 
pragma-dialectical discussion rules. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Eemeren, F. H. van and R. Grootendorst. 1984. Speech acts in argumen-
tative discussions. Dordrecht: Floris. 
Eemeren, F. H. van and R. Grootendorst. 2004. A systematic theory of 
argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
Eemeren, F. H. van, P. Houtlosser and A. F. Snoeck Henkemans. 2008. 
Dialectical profiles and indicators of argumentative moves. Journal 
of Pragmatics 40(3): 475-493. 
Fogal, D., D. W. Harris and M. Moss (eds.). 2018. New work on speech 
acts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Grice, H. P. 1957. Meaning. The Philosophical Review 66(3): 377-388.  
Grice, H. P. 1975. Logic and conversation. In Syntax and semantics, Vol. 
3: Speech acts, eds. P. Cole and J. L. Morgan, 41-58. New York: Ac-
ademic Press. 
Hamblin, C. L. 1970. Fallacies. London: Methuen. 
Hitchcock, D. 2007. Informal logic and the concept of argument. In 
Philosophy of logic, ed. D. Jacquette, Volume 5 of Handbook of the 
philosophy of science, eds. D. M. Gabbay, P. Thaggard and J. Woods, 
101–129. Amsterdam: Elsevier.  
Jackson, S. 1992. “Virtual standpoints” and the pragmatics of conversa-
tional argument. In Argumentation illuminated, eds. F. H. van Eeme-
ren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair and C. A. Willard, 260-269. Amster-
dam: SicSat.  
Jackson, S. and S. Jacobs. 1980. Structure of conversational argument: 




© Marcin Lewiński. Informal Logic, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021), pp. 421–451. 
Jacobs, S. 1989. Speech acts and arguments. Argumentation 3(4): 345-
365. 
Jacobs, S. and S. Jackson. 1981. Argument as a natural category: The 
routine grounds for arguing in conversation. Western Journal of 
Speech Communication 45(2): 118-132. 
Jacobs, S. and S. Jackson. 1989. Building a model of conversational 
argument. In Rethinking communication. Vol 2: Paradigm exemplars, 
eds. B. Dervin, L. Grossberg, B. J. O’Keefe and E. Wartella, 153-
171. Newbury Park: Sage. 
Johnson, C. R. 2019. Investigating illocutionary monism. Synthese 
196(3): 1151-1165. 
Kauffeld, F. J. 1998. Presumptions and the distribution of argumentative 
burdens in acts of proposing and accusing. Argumentation 12(2): 
245-266. 
Langton, R. 2018. Blocking as counter-speech. In New work on speech 
acts, eds. D. Fogal, D.W. Harris and M. Moss, 144-164. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press. 
Levinson, S. C. 1979. Activity types and language. Linguistics 17(5-6): 
365-400. 
Levinson, S. C. 1981. The essential inadequacies of speech act models of 
dialogue. In Possibilities and limitations of pragmatics, eds. H. Par-
ret, M. Sbisà, J. Verschueren, 473-492. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Levinson, S. C. 2013. Action formation and ascription. In Handbook of 
conversation analysis, eds. T. Stivers and J. Sidnell, 103-130. 
Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Lewiński, M. 2012. The paradox of charity. Informal Logic 32(4): 403-
439.  
Lewiński, M. 2014. Argumentative polylogues: Beyond dialectical 
understanding of fallacies. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 
36(1): 193-218. 
Lewiński, M. 2017. Practical argumentation as reasoned advocacy. 
Informal Logic 37(2): 85-113.  
Lewiński, M. 2019. Argumentative discussion: The rationality of what? 
TOPOI: An International Review of Philosophy 38(4): 645-658. 
Lewiński, M. 2021a. Illocutionary pluralism. Synthese. 
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03087-7> 
Lewiński, M. 2021b. Conclusions of practical argument: A speech act 
analysis. Organon F 28(2): 420-457. 
Lewiński, M. and M. Aakhus. 2014. Argumentative polylogues in a 
dialectical framework: A methodological inquiry. Argumentation 
28(2): 161-185. 
Speech Act Pluralism in Argumentative Polylogues 449 
 
© Marcin Lewiński. Informal Logic, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021), pp. 421–451. 
Lewiński, M. and S. Oswald. 2013. When and how do we deal with 
straw men? A normative and cognitive pragmatic account. Journal of 
Pragmatics 59: 164-177. 
Lombardi Valauri, E., L. Baranzini, D. Cimmino, F. Cominetti, C. 
Coppola and G. Mannaioli. 2020. Implicit argumentation and persua-
sion: A measuring model. Journal of Argumentation in Context 9(1): 
95-123. 
McBurney, P. and S. Parsons. 2009. Dialogue games for agent argumen-
tation. In Argumentation in artificial intelligence, eds. I. Rahwan, G. 
R. Simari, 261–280. Dordrecht: Springer. 
McGowan, M. K. 2018. Responding to harmful speech: More speech, 
counter speech, and the complexity of language use. In Voicing dis-
sent: The ethics and epistemology of making disagreement public, ed. 
C. R. Johnson, 182-199. New York: Routledge. 
McGowan, M. K. 2019. Just words: On speech and hidden harm. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press. 
Müller, M-L. 2020. Non-propositional meanings and commitment at-
tribution: More arguments in favor of a cognitive approach. Journal 
of Argumentation in Context 9(1): 148-166.  
Musi, E. and M. Aakhus. 2018. Discovering argumentative patterns in 
energy polylogues: A macroscope for argument mining. Argumenta-
tion 32(3): 397-430. 
Musi, E. and M. Aakhus. 2019. Framing fracking: Semantic frames as 
meta-argumentative indicators for knowledge-driven argument min-
ing of controversies. Journal of Argumentation in Context 8(1): 112-
135. 
Peldszus, A. and M. Stede. 2013. From argument diagrams to argumen-
tation mining in texts: A survey. International Journal of Cognitive 
Informatics and Natural Intelligence 7(1): 1-31. 
Peldszus, A. and M. Stede. 2016. Rhetorical structure and argumentation 
structure in monologue text. In Proceedings of the 3rd workshop on 
argument mining, ACL 2016, 103–112. Association for Computation-
al Linguistics. 
Prakken, H. 2000. On dialogue systems with speech acts, arguments, and 
counterarguments. In Logics in artificial intelligence, eds. M. Ojeda-
Aciego, I. P. de Guzmán, G. Brewka, L. Moniz Pereira, 224-238. 
Berlin: Springer. 
Prakken, H. 2009. Models of persuasion dialogue. In Argumentation in 
artificial intelligence, eds. I. Rahwan, G. R. Simari, 281–300). Dor-
drecht: Springer. 
Reed, C. and K. Budzyńska. 2011. How dialogues create arguments. In 
Proceedings of the Seventh Conference of the International Society 
450 Lewiński 
 
© Marcin Lewiński. Informal Logic, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021), pp. 421–451. 
for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), eds. F. H. van Eemeren, B. 
Garssen, D. Godden and G. Mitchell, 1633-1645. Amsterdam: SicSat. 
Roberts, C. 2012. Information structure in discourse: Towards an inte-
grated formal theory of pragmatics. Semantics & Pragmatics 5, Arti-
cle 6: 1-69. 
Sacks, H. 1992. Lectures on conversation. Vol. I & II. Oxford: Black-
well. 
Saul, J. 2018. Dogwhistles, political manipulation, and philosophy of 
language. In New work on speech acts, eds. D. Fogal, D. W. Harris, 
M. Moss, 360-383). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Saussure, L. de. 2018. The straw man fallacy as a prestige-gaining 
device. In Argumentation and language: Linguistic, cognitive and 
discursive explorations, eds. S. Oswald, T. Herman and J. Jacquin, 
171-190. Cham: Springer. 
Sbisà, M. 2013. Some remarks about speech act pluralism. In Perspec-
tives on pragmatics and philosophy, eds. A. Capone, F. Lo Piparo 
and M. Carapezza, 227-244. Cham: Springer. 
Schumann, J., S. Zufferey and S. Oswald. 2019. What makes a straw 
man acceptable? Three experiments assessing linguistic factors. 
Journal of Pragmatics 141: 1-15.  
Schumann, J., S. Zufferey, and S. Oswald. 2021. The linguistic formula-
tion of fallacies matters: The case of causal connectives. Argumenta-
tion 35(3): 361-388. 
Searle, J. R. 1969. Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Searle, J. R. 1975a. A taxonomy of illocutionary acts. In Language, 
mind, and knowledge, vol. 7, ed. K. Günderson, 344-369. Minneap-
olis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Searle, J. R. 1975b. Indirect speech acts. In Syntax and semantics, 3: 
Speech acts, ed. P. C. J. L. Morgan, 59-82. New York: Academic 
Press. 
Searle, J. R. 1992. Conversation. In (On) Searle on conversation, eds. J. 
R. Searle et al., 7-29). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.  
Searle, J. R. and D. Vanderveken. 1985. Foundations of illocutionary 
logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Snoeck Henkemans, A. F. 2014. Speech act theory and the study of 
argumentation. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 36(1): 41-
58. 
Stanley, J. and Z. G. Szabó. 2000. On quantifier domain restriction. 
Mind & Language 15(2-3): 219-261. 
Strawson, P. F. 1964. Intention and convention in speech acts. The 
Philosophical Review 73(4) 439-460. 
Speech Act Pluralism in Argumentative Polylogues 451 
 
© Marcin Lewiński. Informal Logic, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021), pp. 421–451. 
Tomasello, M. 2008. Origins of human communication. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.  
Walton, D. N. and E. C. W. Krabbe. 1995. Commitment in dialogue: 
Basic concepts of interpersonal reasoning. Albany, NY: State Uni-
versity of New York Press. 
Yaskorska-Shah, O. 2021. Managing the complexity of dialogues in 
context: A data-driven discovery method for dialectical reply struc-
tures. Argumentation. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-020-09543-x>  
 
